In The News
Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of history and international relations at Boston University, also proposes to articulate a new realism in place of what he sees as the arrogant and narcissistic policies of the United States that have brought the country to the brink of “three interlocking crises”: economic and cultural, political and military.
Although he can be eloquent on the subject of how Americans’ consumer culture and pursuit of self-gratification have fueled the country’s growing debt and growing dependence on foreign oil, his new book, “The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism,” is riddled with illogical arguments and dubious assertions that distract attention from its more credible observations.
While Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, in their recent book, “America Between the Wars,” shrewdly pointed out certain continuities in foreign policy between the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Mr. Bacevich makes the sweeping assertion that “Bush and those around him have reaffirmed the pre-existing fundamentals of U.S. policy, above all affirming the ideology of national security to which past administrations have long subscribed” — a dubious assertion he later appears to contest himself in writing about the current White House’s embrace of the radical idea of preventive war.
full story @ nytimes.com >
When we took that attitude, that "let's not pay attention" approach prior to September 11th, of course, we found ourselves in a tragic circumstance. A recent book, America Between the Wars, chronicles what was going on with policy between the Cold War and September 11th. And I have to say that the book is not -- it's not critical of the Clinton administration. It's critical, if anything, of the public mindset which actually made it hard for the Clinton administration to do things that they wanted to do in order to address an emerging threat that they saw but that the public just didn't have the impetus and the commitment to actually see carry-through. Charles Krauthammer, I think, described this period as a "holiday from history." I would argue it was a false holiday from history. I'm sure he would agree.
full speech @ dhs.gov >
That lesson was taken to heart by the extraordinarily skillful foreign-policy team around President George H.W. Bush, which was convinced that it was dangerous to rub Moscow's nose in its own failure. As Western policy shifted in the Clinton years toward doing more to protect those who had suffered Soviet domination, there was no shortage of those who argued that Washington was playing with fire. I remember those debates very well. They were vigorous and impassioned. For all those who warned that it was unwise to poke the Russian bear in the eye, there were those (myself included) who believed that as the principal victims of the Cold War, those who had lived under Soviet oppression deserved any protection they sought. If what they wanted was NATO membership, then that was what they should get.
Kosovo, arguably, was the hardest case of all. At the outset, I opposed the war, not just because the decision to get involved was taken in the teeth of Russian opposition, but also because NATO was openly taking sides in a civil war (Kosovo was legally part of Serbia). As the scale of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo became clear, I changed my mind, coming to believe that there were rare cases when humanitarian intervention — that sly little euphemism for war — was justified. But nobody can say they weren't warned about what would happen next. In their new book America Between the Wars, Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, two former Clinton Administration officials, recount a conversation about Kosovo between Strobe Talbott, Clinton's Deputy Secretary of State, and Yegor Gaidar, a pro-Western, reformist, former Russian Prime Minister. "Oh, Strobe," said Gaidar, "if only you knew what a disaster this war is for those of us in Russia who want for our country what you want."
full story @ time.com >
For those who expected a campaign waged primarily on economic issues, the intense back-and-forth on foreign policy has been a surprise – even though political analysts fully expect bread-and-butter issues to dominate in the fall.
“It is hard to think of another campaign in recent memory, certainly since the end of the Cold War, where foreign policy has played such a huge role,” said Derek Chollet, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, an independent, nonprofit think tank based in Washington. Chollet is the author of a study of how foreign policy developed between the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
full story @ signonsandiego.com >
Trans-Atlantic relations are on the upswing as European leaders have moved beyond their anger over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Still, anti-Bush sentiment runs high on the streets, though that is being mollified by Europeans' excitement about the race for Bush's successor.
Like many Americans, Europeans have Bush fatigue. Many believe Barack Obama and John McCain will have different positions — perhaps more favorable — than Bush on issues important to Europe. The president continues promoting his agenda on climate change, Mideast peace and world trade issues, yet his influence has ebbed.
"I'm sure there will be some protests, but I think people are just looking past this guy at this point and they're interested in what comes next," said James M. Goldgeier, an expert on Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.
full story @ ap.google.com >
No US leader, including Obama if he beats Republican John McCain, can wave a magic wand to bring peace to the Middle East, or halt climate change, or force "rogue states" to renounce their nuclear schemes.
No president can ram through an international treaty or trade agreement if Congress takes umbrage.
What a president Obama would bring, however, is a vast well of goodwill in a world thirsting to re-engage with the sole remaining superpower after eight years of President George W. Bush.
"There is an acknowledgement on both sides of the Atlantic that both the Americans and the Europeans need to manage expectations," said Derek Chollet at Washington's Center for a New American Security.
full story @ afp.google.com >
McCain's criticism of Obama that he would "talk to terrorists and enemies" betrays an appalling ignorance of United States foreign policy history and grand strategy. America has always talked to its enemies and strategically engaged - before the arrogant, unilateralist, hubristic Bush Administration. Another excellent book which has just come off the press and which shatters the Bush foreign policy is America Between the Wars - from 11/9 to 9/11 by Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier.
Franklin Roosevelt talked to Stalin and worked with him against Hitler. Saying that Iran is Germany is historical nonsense and propaganda, and Bush is certainly no Churchill! Rather than Obama's policy threatening global security, it is McCain's misguided and historically jaundiced view which does. If Iran, Syria and North Korea are not engaged, then the US security challenges cannot be met.
full story @ jamaica-gleaner.com >
Europe will be able to make common cause with Mr Obama in a way that they have not with Mr Bush. His agenda would include tackling climate change, closing the Guantanamo Bay prison camp and using international institutions. However, even on Iraq, where Mr Obama's promise to withdraw troops would appear to be in line with the policy pursued by allies such as Britain, there may be trouble ahead.
Derek Chollet, a Democratic foreign policy expert and the author of America Between the Wars, said: “Europe is only just beginning to consider what Obama means when he calls for a ‘diplomatic surge' to accompany military disengagement. There is still a sense at the highest levels of government that Iraq is America's problem - and that would change very quickly.”
full story @ timesonline.co.uk >
McCAIN’S CRITICS HAVE pointed to this early part of his political career to make the case that he later underwent a radical change in his philosophy, veering from a cautious approach to military force to a more hawkish, even bellicose mentality. His own aides, meanwhile, contend that McCain’s philosophy has been entirely constant; they say his opposition to limited and ill-defined operations like Somalia and Bosnia wasn’t at all inconsistent with his willingness, later, to use overwhelming force against a tyrant like Saddam Hussein.
The problem with these narratives is that neither reflects the context of the time. As two former national security officials in the Clinton administration, Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, explain compellingly in “America Between the Wars,” a book to be published next month, the period between the cold war and the war on terror — the 90s, roughly speaking — was a decade when foreign-policy thinkers across the ideological spectrum were groping about in darkness, trying to feel out the limits of American power and to balance the twin risks of action and inaction. During that time, the United States bounced from one unforeseen crisis to another, undertaking a military intervention every 18 months, on average — a staggering pace compared with that of the years that came before. Old ideological alliances in Washington were shattered and reformed, as pacifists lined up with conservative isolationists to battle liberal hawks and neoconservatives. New terms — “failed state,” “humanitarian intervention,” “ethnic cleansing” — entered the American lexicon. It’s fair to say, then, that McCain did evolve in his views on when and how to use American force over the course of the decade, but it’s misleading to separate his evolution from the larger transformation that was happening all around him.
full story @ nytimes.com >
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